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Ethnicity and restructuring of the state in Ethiopia   
 
Berhanu Gutema Balcha1  
 
 
Introduction 
Ethnicity has been a key criterion in restructuring the Ethiopian state in 
federal lines. The cases of dissolved ethno-federal arrangements such as that 
of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia resonated pessimism about 
the feasibility of federalism based on ethno linguistic lines. In contrast, some 
relatively successful ethno-linguistic federal arrangements like those of India 
and Switzerland have shown the feasibility of ethnic federalism in divided 
societies. Both, critiques and advocates of ethnic federalism have their 
justifications. Advocates hold that ethnic federalism could reduce groups’ 
disparity, promote accommodation and self-rule, encourage ethnic harmony 
through co-existence and reduce secession or disintegration tendencies 
(Lijphart 1977 and 2002, Gurr and Harff 1994; Hameso 1997; Kimenyi 
1997; Clapham 2001; O’Leary 2002; Osaghae 2006; Kymlicka 2006). In 
contrast, critiques argue that ethnic federalism could institutionalise ethnic 
discrimination, obstruct individual citizens rights, strengthen centrifugal 
forces, introduce zero-sum ethnic competition and generate dangerous 
reactions like ethnic cleansing, expulsion and disintegration (Lipset 1963; 
Nordlinger 1972; Ake 1996; Fleiner 2000; Nyong'o 2002; Egwe 2003; 
Mamdani 2005).     
 
 
Defining Ethnicity 
There is no generally agreed definition or theory of ethnicity; scholars define 
and describe the term in various ways, such as a modern cultural construct, a 
universal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a peculiar kind of informal 
political organisation or affective association. To begin with those who 
identify the symbolic and subjective side of ethnicity, Hutchinson and Smith 
(1996), for example, define ethnie (the French term used to denote an 'ethnic 
community' or 'ethnic group') as 'a named human population with a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of 
common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at 
least some of its members’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 7). In this 
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definition, the subjective and ethno-symbolic importance and orientation to 
the past play a key role as 'the destiny of the community is bound up with 
ethno-history, with its own understanding of a unique, shared past.  
 
Contrary to this approach, Fukui and Markakis refute the attempt to define 
ethnic identities on the basis of genealogical or cultural criteria by claiming 
that a complex pattern of fusion and fission among groups is the reality.  
They argue therefore that ethnic identities are to be understood as essentially 
political products of socially defined and historically determined specific 
situation (Fuku and Markakis 1994:06). Similar to this argument, David 
Turton argues, 'an ethnic group is not a group because of ethnicity but 
because its members engage in common action and share common interests’ 
(Turton 1994: 17). However this assertion does not necessarily mean that the 
assumed genealogical or cultural traits are completely irrelevant. Fuku and 
Markakis recognize Allen's (1994) concern regarding the mere dismissal of 
ethnic/tribal labels, on the grounds that they do represent a social reality, 
despite the genealogical and cultural lacunae in their make-up. In his study 
of two ethnic groups in the Sudan and Uganda border area, Allen observes 
how collective fears and hatreds serve in the production and concretisation 
of ‘specific cultural qualities, the elaboration of tradition, the definition of 
moral spheres and the articulation of social boundaries’ (Allen 1994: 114).  
Likewise, for Thomas Eriksen (1993) ethnicity simply refers to relationships 
between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and, these 
groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society. He therefore describes 
ethnicity in terms of ‘the classification of people and group relationship’ that 
has ‘a political, organisational aspects as well as a symbolic one’ (Eriksen 
1993: 13) Similarly, for Paul Brass 'ethnicity is a sense of ethnic identity that 
can be used ‘to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from 
other groups’ (Brass 1991: 19).  He posits that ‘ethnicity or ethnic identity 
also involves in addition to subjective self-consciousness, a claim to status 
and recognition, either as a superior group or as at least equal to other group’ 
(Ibid).  
 
Nevertheless, Horowitz argues that: ‘Many of the puzzle presented by 
ethnicity become much less confusing once we abandon the attempt to 
discover the vital essence of ethnicity and instead regard ethnic affiliations 
as being located along a continuum of ways in which people organize and 
categorize themselves’ (Horowitz 1985: 55). According to Horowitz that 
although ethnic groups believe in extended kinship and putative common 
descent, ethnic groups can be placed at various points along the birth-choice 
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continuum, but not a dichotomy between them. ‘There are fictive elements 
here, but the idea, if not always the fact, of common ancestry makes it 
possible for ethnic group to think in terms of family resemblance’ (Ibid. p. 
56). Thus, membership to the ethnic group is typically not chosen but given 
because the putative kinship ties are the basic criterion (Ibid). As a result, for 
political mobilization, kinship tie due to their inducing power could be used 
to establish a compelling organization to pursue political goals.  ‘If group 
members are potential kinsmen, a threat to any members of the group may 
be seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the family’ (Ibid. p. 64). 
However, Horowitz holds that ‘the putatively ascriptive character of ethnic 
identifications makes interethnic compromise so difficult and poses special 
difficulties for democratic politics in divided societies’ (Ibid. pp. 53-4). 
Besides, he warns that ‘ethnic affiliation is not just a convenient vehicle by 
which elites satisfy their own class aspirations’ (Ibid. p. 89). Despite the fact 
that the study of ethnicity is confronted with such various terminological and 
conceptual problems as well as without a shared perspective, much of the 
literature on the theories of ethnicity is often divided into two broad 
approaches of primordialists and instrumentalists. These two approaches are 
discussed below.      
 
 
The Primordialism Argument 
The primordialist conceptualisation of ethnic community is founded on the 
belief of the ‘overpowering’ and ‘ineffable quality’ of primordial 
attachments that arise from being born into a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language and following 
particular social practices (Geertz 1973). Steven Grosby associates the terms 
‘primordial’ as a cognitive reference to the objects of attachments or ties 
around which various kinds of kinship are formed (Grosby 1994: 168). It 
was Edward Shils (1975) who coined the term ‘primordial’ in his argument 
that family attachment are embedded in a primordial relational quality that 
attaches ineffable importance to blood. Following on the line of 
primordialism, Clifford Geertz argued that primordial identities are given 
and ineffable that can be overpowering or coercive (Geertz 1973: 259). 
According to this explanation some attachments flow more from natural 
affinity than from social interaction. Primordialists maintain that the 
importance human beings attribute to biological connection is neither 
capricious nor accidental, but is connected to unique and very close 
nurturing and relationships that make a bond from generation to generation 
with an experience of deeply rooted, intimate and eternal belonging. The 
4 
congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are overpowering and 
coercive. To that effect Grosby claim that ‘this is one of the reasons why 
human beings have scarified their lives and continue to scarify their lives for 
their own family and for their own nation’ (Grosby 1994: 169). In other 
words, primordialists believe that pre-modern attachments and historical 
memories are crucial in shaping and mobilising groups. ‘Ethnic groups and 
nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action toward 
primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial 
location’ (Ibid. p. 168).   
 
The primordialists argue that though primordial discontent strives more 
deeply and is less easily satisfied as ethnicity has been manipulated for 
racism and horrific purposes, modern man has perpetuated similar horrible 
acts because of philosophical, political, economic, and religious reasons 
connected to modernity. As Fishman states ‘modern man’s capacity for 
committing horrible acts is a by-product of modernity basically unrelated to 
ethnicity or to the biological assumption of ethnicity in particular’ (Fishman 
1980: 86). Likewise, Pierre van den Berghe points out that ‘brothers do 
murder each other, but not gratuitously and not as easily as strangers’ (van 
den Berghe 1995: 362). Furthermore, Fishman claims that the manipulation 
of ethnicity ‘to attain political, economic and cultural goal is a modern 
manifestation and certainly one of the least unique feature of ethnicity’. 
Thus, according to Fishman, ‘ethnicity must be approached seriously, even 
sympathetically, as a social dimension that has received too little attention 
and too much abuse during the past two centuries’ (Fishman 1980: 84).   
 
Primordialists reject the linear association of ethnicity with conflict or 
racism, rather they emphases the need to take advantage of the emotional 
benefit imbued within ethnicity. In this respect, Fishman believes that 
ethnicity can serve to exert responsibility to preserve and transmit the great 
heritage of human existence to generation after generation and its 
unashamed and vigorous devotion to be related to others as kin ‘is one of the 
most powerful motivation of human kind’ (Ibid. p. 85). Especially, at times 
of uncertainty and change, ethnicity could give direction and identity to 
preserve our own existence. Fishman argues that ethnicity is continuity 
within the self and within the link to a common ancestor by experiencing 
being ‘bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood’ (Ibid. 
pp. 84-85).  
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In its extreme version, radical primordialists or sociobiologists, such as 
Pierre van den Berghe (1981), go to the extent of regarding genetic 
reproductive capacity as the basis, not only of families and clans, but also of 
wider ethnic groups. Sociobiologists claim the continuity between kinship 
and ethnicity and thus consider ethnic groups as wider kinship-based 
groupings. Pierre van den Berghe holds that kins are likely to cling together 
than strangers and the chance of cooperation can depend more on the extent 
of how closely people are related, while cooperation between strangers 
depends on the incentives or rewards created for all. As he claims that ‘an 
altruistic transactions can be expected if, and only if, the cost benefit ratio of 
the transaction is smaller than the coefficient of genetic relatedness between 
the two actors’ (van den Berghe 1981: 20). Thus, he argued that because 
ethnic groups share more genes with co-ethnics therefore they tend to exhibit 
more self-sacrifice towards kin than non-kin because of, what he identified 
as an impulse of ‘ethnic nepotism’ or ‘extended kin selection’. In short, 
people are likely to show nepotistic leaning toward kinsmen and fellow 
ethnic as ‘all social organisms are biologically programmed to be nepotistic, 
i.e. to behave favourable (or ‘altruistically’) to others in proportion to their 
real or perceived degree of common ancestry’ (van den Berghe 1995: 360). 
The main argument of sociobiologist is that a desire of human beings to 
identify themselves with kith and kin is inherently natural. Ethnicity is like 
an extended family and therefore it is explained in terms of a biological 
paradigm or a genetic aspect. For van den Berghe, ethnicity is both 
primordial and instrumental, as it ‘cannot be invented or imagined out of 
nothing. It can be manipulated, used, exploited, stressed, fused or 
subdivided, but it must correlate with a pre-existing population bound by 
preferential endogamy and a common historical experience’ (Ibid. p. 361). 
 
With regard to nation-state construction, the primordialists maintain that the 
drive for efficient, dynamic modern states could directly interact with the 
drive for personal identity, which is based on primordial ties. The 
primordialists therefore claim that in areas where the practice of civil politics 
is deficient or weak, primordial attachments (such as territorial location) 
could be used to devolve political power and delimit territorial units. In his 
attempt to establish a link between ethnic identity and state formation, 
Greetz (1973) claimed that ‘in modernizing societies, where the tradition of 
civil politics is weak…primordial attachments tend, as Nehru discovered, to 
be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually, proposed and widely 
acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous political 
unit’ (Geertz 1973: 26). Geertz warned that ‘primordial discontent strives 
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more deeply and is satisfied less easily’, while ‘civil discontent finds its 
natural outlet in the seizing, legally or illegally, of the state’s apparatus’ 
(Ibid. p. 261). Thus, he argued that ‘economic or class or intellectual 
disaffection threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language or 
culture threatens partitions, irredentism or merger, a redrawing of the very 
limits of the state, a new definition of its domain (Ibid.). Similarly, Hameso 
Y. Seyoum in his optimism regarding ethnicity in Africa (1997) argues that 
if properly guided, ethnicity could serve in mobilising resources to achieve 
favourable goals of the human society like social justice, political change 
and economic development in Africa. He explains that if ethnicity is part and 
parcel of African identity, it is appropriate to be positive about oneself 
(Hameso 1997). Hameso claims that it is favourable and desirable for people 
who share common symbol, history, destiny, and future aspirations to have 
their own self-administration. Based on the basic assumption of their 
approach, primordialists criticise the social constructionist thesis of ethnic 
groups for its disregard of tradition and the fundamental features of human 
existence. John Armstrong (1982), for example, claims that ethnicity and 
nationhood are identical and ethnic identities are instrumental in the gradual 
emergence of modern national identity and territorial-national formation 
after a long historical process. 
     
On the other hand, primordialism has been criticized for presenting a static 
and naturalistic view of ethnicity that mystifies emotion and reduces cultural 
and social behaviour to biological drives. Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan, for 
example, argue that: ‘Ethnicity is surely an affect issue, making it distinct 
from strictly material or instrumental issues, but this by no means makes it 
primordial but has a clear and analysable socio-genesis’ (Eller and Coughlan 
1993:200). Furthermore, the ‘given-ness’ of ethnicity does not entail that 
people are condemned to their ethnic attachment forever. The destiny of man 
is progressive (Kedourie 1993: 69). The primordial assumption ignores 
‘change and dissolution of ethnic groups, not to speak of the more modern 
processes of fusion of ethnic groups through intermarriage’ (Llobera 1999: 
04). Many ethnic groups are often characterised by internal diversity that 
reflecting various political commitments, lineage cleavages, ideologies, class 
and occupational backgrounds, as well as differentially located communities 
(Forrest 2004: 25).    
 
In addition, primordialists underemphasize people’s passions and strong 
dedication to rational values, sense of duties, classes and other socially 
constructed supreme goals. Cooperation and intimacy among people do not 
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take place only between kin, but also can extend to non-kin groups based on 
belief system, ideological commitments, professional interests and other 
pragmatically required or developed shared commonalities beyond 
primordial sentiments. Economic, social, political or environmental 
conditions have a capacity to generate both conflict and cooperation among 
humankind.  Likewise, the primordial theories generally claim that racial 
and ethnic identities are affectively fulfilling, but fail to address those 
circumstances in which such identities are used as the basis for inequalities 
and might thus be socially ‘bad’ in breeding ethnic inequalities. Thus, the 
value dimension of primordialism is as incomplete and inconsistent as the 
theoretical analyses on which they hinge (Thompson 1989: 181).      
 
 
The Instrumentalist Argument 
Instrumentalists highly differ from the primordialist conception of ethnicity. 
They grasp ethnicity as ‘a social construct that emphasizes the sharing of 
cultural and linguistic characteristic and, kinship roots for the purpose of 
group mobilization (Messay, 2001: 268). Instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a 
socially constructed focal point for mobilization. They argue that ethnicity is 
constructed by particular elite or group driven by competition for political 
power, economic benefits, social status or other objectives and motives. It is 
a social, political, and cultural construct for specific and different interests 
and status groups and consequently an elastic and highly adjustable 
instrument to serve particular or multiple objectives.  
 
According to Paul Brass (1991) ethnicity or ethnic identity involves a claim 
to status and recognition, either as a superior group or as group at least equal 
to other groups; therefore it seeks the articulation and acquisition of social, 
economic and political rights for the member of the group or for the group as 
a whole. He describes ethnicity as ‘a sense of ethnic identity, consisting of 
the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people of any 
aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups  
(Brass, 1991: 18). He holds that the process and benefit of modernisation 
could unleash ethnic self-consciousness and ethnically based demands if it 
proceeds unevenly by favouring some ethnic groups or some regions of a 
country more than others. Thus, ‘ethnic communities are created and 
transformed by particular elites in modernising and in post-industrial society 
undergoing dramatic social change…through competition between 
competing elites for political power, economic benefit and social status 
within and among ethnic category’ (Ibid. p. 25). Particularly, competition 
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and conflict between inter-ethnic elites is considered as the major cause 
behind ethnic self-consciousness and ethnic-based demands. Basically, for 
instrumentalists, ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon, in the sense 
that it is the association of cultural differences with political cleavages 
(Cohen 1969). It is the identification of political domination and oppression 
with identity manifestations in order to mobilise and organise political 
resistance and action. Ethnic consciousness usually has a political 
connotation as it easily provides the basis for joint political action in case of 
threat or opportunity. Accordingly, instrumentalists hold that rather than 
common descent, shared political experiences and commonalities of political 
memories are crucial in forging ethnic consciousness and belief in a 
common ethnicity. According to Barth, ethnicity is a form of social 
organization that emphasizes cultural difference between groups whose 
symbolic and social boundaries have been established due to specific 
ecological, economic, historical or political situations (Barth 1969). 
Moreover, Barth argues, that ‘ethnic identities function as categories of 
inclusion/exclusion and of interaction about which both ego and alter must 
agree if their behaviour is to be meaningful’ (Barth 1969:132). Thus, to a 
great extent ethnic leaders or ethnic entrepreneurs are the major agents in 
articulating ethnic group’s political and other factional demands (Barth 
1969). 
 
Similar to the instrumentalist approach, rational choice theorists like Hechter 
(1994) assume that ‘individuals adapt means to their ends in such a way as 
to approach the most efficient manner of achieving them’, therefore ethnic 
group will engage in collective action only when they estimate that by doing 
so they will receive net individual benefit (Hechter 1986: 268). The major 
assumption of the rational choice argument is that individuals always act in a 
manner to maximize their benefit. Also, in some circumstances, individuals 
could choose to act in accordance with the interest of their ethnic group 
though their net individual benefit at face value may seem less than the 
collective benefit.  
 
In the case of Africa, Leroy Vail (1985) posits that, in many cases, 
individuals’ commitment and membership to a particular ethnic group is not 
induced because they dislike others, or not because being a member of the 
group made them feel good, ‘but rather because the ethnic apparatus of the 
rural area- the chiefs, ‘traditional’ courts, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and 
the systematised ‘traditional’ values of the ‘tribe’ as embodied in the ethnic 
ideology- all worked to preserve the very substantial interests which these 
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men had in their home areas’ (Vail 1985:15). Accordingly, Vail that 
ethnicity has been attractive both to the elites and ordinary men in Africa, 
particularly, appealed to the elites because it can ensure them a leadership 
role in the rising political mobilisation. And for the ordinary African men, 
ethnicity could help them bring a measure of control to the difficult 
situations in which they have found themselves in their day-to-day life. 
Moreover, Vail explains that appeal to ethnicity in Africa is also made ‘to 
conserve a way of life that was in the process of being rapidly undermined 
by the growth of capitalist relations’ and then, it may be interpreted as ‘a 
form of popular resistance to the forces that were reshaping African lives’ 
(Ibid.).   
 
In many of ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa, historical memories and 
ideology based on real historical event or myths such as population 
movements, conflicts, alliances and other similar events also played an 
important role in the creation and maintenance of ethnic identities (Fukui 
1994: 33), (Lamphear 1994: 63), (Matsuda 1994: 61). In his study of the 
formation and transformation of ethnic boundaries in the Omo valley of 
southern-Ethiopia, Katsuyoshi Fukui argues that: ‘It is obvious that an ethnic 
group is not a separate and impervious unit, but one that is in a constant state 
of flux in relation to its neighbours, merging with one, separating from 
another, over the course of time’ (Fukui 1994: 44). Similarly, David Turton 
(1986) in his study of ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia finds that in a 
number of cases, ethnic identities at the periphery have been formed through 
relationship with other groups.  He also discerns a phenomenon whereby a 
minority group accepted subordination and stigmatisation by the majority 
group in return for receiving protection against other groups (Turton 1986: 
158). Ties formed between groups therefore can also reinforce ethnic 
identities of the partners (Matsuda 1994: 60).   
 
Furthermore, inclusion of many ethnic groups in the same territory does not 
necessarily bring ethnic conflict or ethnic hostilities. In his study of ethnicity 
in the Sudan and Uganda border, Tim Allen (1999: 121) explores how 
generational durable peaceful relations between two ethnic groups in 
Uganda’s villages was turned into ethnic cleansing because of actions and 
behaviours of ethnocratic leaders at the state’s centre. Similarly, Wendy 
James in her study of ethnic groups in the Sudan-Ethiopia border area, 
observed how threats of persecution on basis of ethnic identification had 
contributed to a growing sense of collective ethnic identity or ethnic 
‘visibility’ for survival among the people who found themselves caught 
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involuntarily in a conflict (James 1994: 162). She argues that ‘visibility’ as a 
distinct ethnic group can be both advantageous and disadvantageous, 
according to whether one is seeking protection and aid, or avoiding attack 
and victimization (Ibid. p. 163).  
 
In a study of ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa, Markakis also concludes 
that ‘ethnicity is an imperative embedded in the foundations of the political 
order and functions as a controlling factor in the political process, long 
before an ethnic movement appears to challenge that order’ (Markakis 1994: 
236). Markakis argues that ethnicity has become catalysts for political 
conflict in the Horn of Africa due to two objective factors: competition for 
resources in condition of great scarcity and the role the state plays in 
controlling the allocation of these resources (Ibid. p. 217).  
 
In such a situation, ethnicity has become the preferred and most efficient 
basis for political mobilization against the 'ethnocratic state', whose capacity 
in the distribution of resources is paramount. In his analysis of ethnicity in 
Africa, Messay (2001) also argues that ‘the African ruling elite have 
fashioned 'a patrimonial system of authority' intent on excluding competitors 
and rewarding followers. Ethnicity and ethnonationalism is born of protest 
against this exclusion, for the purpose of controlling the political resources 
of the state’ (Messay 2001: 272). Conflict is not waged for its own sake, but 
for desired objectives (Fukui 1994: 44). The postcolonial African states 
‘introduced a new prize for rival ethnic communities over which to fight and 
a frightening new force with which to contend’ (Smith 2000: 22). Hence, in 
some cases, the rise of ethnic identity is attributable to specific types of 
interactions between the leadership of centralizing states and the elites from 
the local ethnic groups, especially but not exclusively on the peripheries of 
those states (Brass 1991: 29). ‘Conflicts either between competing 
landholders and alien conquerors, between competing religious elites or 
between religious leaders and local aristocracy that the first stage of ethnic 
transformation often begin’ (Ibid).      
 
In these respects, Markakis, in his ‘situational perspective’ approach based 
in the context of the Horn of Africa, concludes that: ‘an ethnic group as a 
political actor is a product of the situation, not of history, and what mobilises 
its members to take collective action is concern for future prospects, not an 
atavistic attachments to the past’ (Markakis 1994: 236). Ethnic groups’ sense 
of sharing the same material and social prospects are more important than 
ethnic identity because identity is defined in the process of interaction- co-
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operation, competition, confrontation, even war- among groups (Ibid).  In a 
similar vein, though Forrest (2004: 02) argues that collaborative political 
behaviour in pre-colonial times- among villages, localities, groups, leaders, 
and polities- provides historical and cultural subtexts for the assertion of 
regional autonomy, he states that these pre-colonial traditions cannot explain 
the rise or expansion of autonomy-seeking ethnic or regional movements. 
Rather, he emphasises the overarching instrumental, situational, ascriptive 
and economic factors that were present in colonial and post-colonial periods. 
He asserts that ‘when ascriptive and instrumental political behaviour 
coincides with the evolution of constructivist and materialist factors, the 
conditions for subnationalist movement mobilization are favourable’ (Ibid.).    
  
Consequently, Messay argues ‘that contrary to atavistic remnant, ethnicity is 
a strong social force that must be properly considered and managed in order 
to obliterate its destructive roles in politics’ (Messay 2001: 283). Without 
careful approach and proper treatment, ethnic plurality therefore would lead 
to conflict production, as the elite becomes the key actors in the creation of 
ethnic ideology and ethnic politics for acquisition of political power. 
Political power is the focal point of ethnic claims because it constitutes one 
of the important ‘rituals by which status is determined’. In this climate of 
elite competition ‘a fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a 
motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end and it is also sought 
for confirmation of ethnic status’ (Horowitz 1985: 187). Public offices or 
honorific state responsibilities could be used to instrumentalise 
discrimination or favouritism in distribution of statuses and resources. 
Particularly, in multiethnic African societies an exclusive access to state’s 
resources and power by a particular group could create a process of ‘social 
closure’ that can alienate others groups from playing any significant role in 
politics and economics. An ethnocratic state that monopolises politics and 
economics in favour of a specific ethnic group is the major breeding ground 
for producing ethnonationalist movements. As Max Weber states that ethnic 
group ‘can has a political meaning, it easily provides the basis for joint 
political action on the part of the group members or Volksgenossen who 
consider one another as blood relatives’ (Roth and Wittich 1968: 394).  
 
Aware of the potential difficulties involved in nation-building, the 
instrumentalists belief to consider ethnic identity as a core criterion in state 
construction may be very awkward since there is always incompatibility 
between state territories and ethno linguistic homogeneity. On the other 
hand, the awful option of using brutal force to bring about the desired 
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homogeneous space with a single language and uniform conception of 
history has become difficult and also considered to be ineffective in many 
places.  
 
In sum, the core argument of instrumentalism is that ethnicity is flexible and 
changeable; circumstances can shape or change the symbolic and social 
boundaries that define the ethnic group. Ethnicity is therefore dynamic and 
changes according to new circumstances; group shifts their content and 
boundary according to circumstances. Individuals or groups do not belong to 
a particular ethnic group on a permanent basis. Through the process of 
fission and fusion, and other considerations like sense of security or material 
interests, people change their ethnic affiliation or can belong to more than 
one ethnic group at the same time.   
 
Nevertheless, the critique of instrumentalists points out firstly, the 
instrumentalist’s underestimation of the subjective and affective side of 
human society by reducing them to instruments of mere material or other 
interests by undervaluing ‘the roles of both the sacred and ethnicity in 
kindling mass fervour and self-sacrifice’ (Smith 2000: 25). In Africa, ethnic 
groups often retained a significant portion of their pre-colonial linguistic and 
cultural identity (Forrest 2004: 29). According to Kwesi Prah that: ‘The 
overwhelming masses of Africans continue to live in fairly coherent 
tradition-bound communities in rural Africa…from pre-colonial times to the 
present, cultural features like kinship systems, belief systems and religious 
practices, mythology, languages, cultural value systems and other customary 
usages have been real in Africa’ (Prah 2004: 8-16). Secondly, the 
instrumentalism claim of excessive mutability of ethnic group is challenged 
by experiences of some nations in which identities are more fixed for longer 
period of time or have shown strong ethnic component like in France, 
Greeks and Switzerland. Anthony Smith argues that: ‘…the civic-territorial 
and ethnocultural ideals of the nation are closely interwoven…in logic there 
may be a good case for such distinction, but in practice it is difficult to find 
any examples of a ‘pure’ cultural nationalism, freed from its ethnic 
moorings. It is certainly not to be found in Europe’ (Smith 2000: 18-19). 
Thirdly, instrumentalist’s approach is also criticised for its exaggerated 
belief in the power of elite manipulation of the masses and neglecting of the 
wider cultural environment in which elite competition and rational 
maximization take place (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 09). Forrest explains 
that in Africa, ‘certain aspects of social and cultural lineage enable 
contemporary peoples to identify with specific pre-colonial collectivities… 
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even if identities did not always congeal as ethnic group in pre-colonial 
Africa, there may not have been as clean a break in social continuity as hard-
line constructivists presume’ (Forrest 2005: 28).     Instrumentalist and 
primordialist influences are in many cases closely interlinked. Ethnic groups 
behaviour are influenced by a ‘double action’ between elites’ goal and 
individuals’ conceptualisation of identity. It involves a dynamic interaction 
(Ibid. p. 10). Fourthly, the instrumentalists approach is criticized for 
reducing qualitatively different beliefs into some putatively uniform ‘real’ 
cause, for example, ‘interest’, ‘power’ ‘emotion’ due to reductionism 
thereby denying the relative independence of the achievements of the mind 
and the plurality of orientation of human action (Grosby 1994:167).       
 
 
Summary and relevance to Ethiopia 
Despite the various approaches and interpretations, as presented above, 
ethnicity remains a theoretical challenge and an empirical nuisance. It is 
often associated with conflict, instability and carnage. The cause can vary 
from case to case. Though there is no necessary connection between 
ethnicity and conflict as Horowitz argues, the basis for confrontation may 
emerge due to the inclusion of two or more ethnic communities within a 
single or adjacent territory of a state characterised by discriminatory and 
uneven status and resource allocations. ‘An ethnic contrast that has produced 
an extraordinary amount of conflict in many African, Asian, and Caribbean 
states is the juxtaposition of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ groups’ (Horowitz 
1985: 148). A system of oppression and subjugation of ethnic groups, elitist 
manipulations for autonomy or separation, reassertion of a once-
predominant role, uneven regional development and other visible or putative 
inequalities could trigger ethnic hostilities and conflicts. Particularly, when 
the economic inequalities and the lop-sided distribution of political rewards 
in multiethnic states are attached to specific ethnic groups due to the process 
of state formation and expansion, the likelihood of separatist ethnic 
movements and conflicts could be high. As Ted Gurr (1994) in his cross-
national study of communal based conflicts, shows that in many instances 
ethnic tensions and conflicts are more likely when certain groups perceive 
discrimination or exploitation in the context of state formation. Gurr notes 
that ethnic conflicts are usually centre on three general issues: ‘the desire for 
‘exit’ or independence from the state, the demand for greater autonomy 
within the state or the recognition and protection of minority interests within 
a plural society (Gurr 1994: 111). He also adds that ‘ethnic identity and 
interest per se do not risk unforeseen ethnic wars; rather, the danger is 
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hegemonic elites who use the state to promote their own people’s interest at 
the expense of others (Gurr 2000: 64). Thus, he warns that ‘the push of state 
corruption and minority repression probably will be a more important source 
of future ethnic wars than the ‘pull’ of opportunity’ (Ibid). 
 
Similarly, Joshua Forrest (2004), in his investigation of the process of 
political mobilisation of subnational movements in Africa, argues that 
growing tendencies toward regional assertions and autonomy seeking are 
increasingly challenging the African states (Forrest 2004: 20). He 
enumerates four overarching processes that were manifest in the colonial 
period and the post-independence era as important causative factors that 
could help to explain the expansion of autonomy or secession seeking 
subnational movements in contemporary Africa. These are the history of 
state intervention in regional affairs (‘situationalism and constructivism’), 
long-term economic inequalities (‘material’), individual’s conscious or 
ascriptive adherence to ethnic or regional identity pattern (‘ascriptive 
identity’), and manipulation by regional political leaders or elites 
(‘instrumentalist leadership’) (Ibid, pp. 9-14). He, thus, suggests that the 
growth of autonomy-seeking ethnoregional movements and the pattern of 
mobilization in the present-day Africa necessitates a negotiated political 
framework based on indigenously legitimate forms of power that can 
provide sufficient autonomy at the regional or local level (Ibid. p. 250). 
Another scholar also maintains that ‘if indeed ethnicity and ethnic 
organisations provide security to groups in an uncertain environment, then 
attempts to replace or outlaw them may have the effect of increasing 
insecurity’  (Horowitz 1985: 567-8). As Connor (1994: 83) points out that 
ethnonational group members are ‘obsessed with a vision of freedom from 
domination by non-members’ and therefore they inclined to persistently 
struggle for self-rule or autonomy (Ibid.).  ‘A fear of ethnic domination and 
suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end and 
it is also sought for confirmation of ethnic status’ (Horowitz 1985: 187). 
 
Understanding such circumstances, it is essential to embark on a sensitively 
designed political engineering in order to device appropriate power-sharing 
frameworks that could mitigate destructive conflicts in deeply divided 
societies. Rather optimistically, Horowitz asserts that even if ethnic 
problems are intractable, they are not altogether without hope; ‘even in the 
most severely divided societies, ties of blood do not lead to ineluctably to 
rivers of blood’ (Ibid. p. 682). Power-sharing political frameworks that could 
encourage inter-ethnic cooperation by ensuring recognition of some 
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prominent group’s rights could be one option to minimise group’s 
resentments and mitigate destructive conflicts. As Gurr suggests that ‘with a 
little bit of luck and a great deal of international engagement, ethnic 
conflict’s heyday will belong to the last century’ (Gurr 2000: 64). Horowitz 
also stresses on the importance of timing in engineering a political process 
and structure, because ‘accommodation long delayed may be 
accommodation ultimately denied’ (Horowitz 1985: 617). Although prior 
prescription or commitment to a single institutional form may not be helpful, 
federalism is often considered to be an appropriate arrangement in the 
provision of accommodative and flexible political frameworks 
notwithstanding ethnic cleavages and competitions.   
 
In the Ethiopian context, in many cases, the emergence of ethnic 
consciousness and ethnic mobilization may not due to inherent atavistic or 
primordial sentiments, but due to social, political and economic reasons. 
However primordial factors such as putative common descent, ancestral 
linkage, language and the like have become a foundation for nurturing of 
solidarity and political mobilization by the elites. Conceptually, three major 
intellectual perspectives exist in Ethiopia’s political debate in connection to 
Ethnicity. The first perspective believes that the Ethiopian society has 
reached a stage of common identity by nurturing a common Ethiopian 
citizenship by obliterating primordial attachments and loyalties (Daniel 
1992; Alem 1993). The second perspective believes that Ethiopia is a home 
for numerous distinct ethnic groups that need to get some form of political 
representation and self-administration (Merera 2003; Fasil 1997). The third 
perspective argues that the Ethiopian state was established through a series 
of conquests and colonization of various nations and societies such as 
Oromo and Somali that lay beyond its jurisdiction (Mohammed 1999; 
Assefa 1993; Dolal 1992).  
 
At the political level, there have been ethnic organizations in the name of 
various ethnic groups such as Afar, Oromo, Somali, Sidama, and Tigrayan 
since the 1970s. At present due to the policy of ethnic restructuring and 
ethnic entitlement since 1991 there are nearly hundred ethnic organizations 
that are legally registered in Ethiopia (National Election Board of Ethiopia 
2005).  Although a detail study is not carried out on the nature and 
conviction of these ethnic organizations, it is plausible to claim that in many 
cases that the major inspirational forces for these ethnic organizations are the 
attainment of social, political and economic objective rather than primordial 
or atavistic drives. In almost all cases, the claims for ethnic mobilization and 
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solidarity have been made in the context of redressing ‘injustices of the 
past’, reclaiming of dignified existence and self-administration, developing 
of culture and usage of languages which were ignored and barred in the past. 
These claims are more of a demand for social status, political power and 
economic benefits (instrumental) rather than preserving or nurturing 
relationships that make a bond from generation to generation or recognising 
the overpowering and coercive congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so 
on (primordial). However, putative generational bond or primordial 
attachment has been exploited to advance these social, political and 
economic objectives and this has inclined to create a ‘permanent’ cleavage 
that could widen and has opened a venue for further exclusion, 
discrimination and hostilities.  
 
Markais (1994) claims that the rise of ethnic mobilisation and movement in 
the Horn of Africa (including Ethiopia) has been aiming in controlling or 
weakening the state that has a great role in the allocation of resources, 
political power and social status.  Especially, when the central state is 
identified or accused with ethnic category or ethnic favouritism, the chance 
for ethnic mobilisation would be high. In this connection, the central rule in 
Ethiopia has always been accused of favouring particular ethnic groups. 
Prior to 1991, some ethnic and regional liberation movements from Eritrea, 
Tigray, Oromo and Somali described the central rule as an ‘Amhara rule’, 
and this gave an advantage for the movements to mobilise significant 
supporters and fighters in ethnic lines. A call for a ’primordial’ solidarity has 
become a crucial factor in consolidating a struggle and fight to achieve non-
primordial political, economic and social objectives.  
 
Since 1991, the federal government in Ethiopia has been described as a 
Tigrayan dominated government and thus various ethnic movements are 
rising to challenge the alleged domination of the Tigrayan group on the 
bases of ethnic solidarity.  
 
Thus, it can be plausible to assert that the rise of ethnic solidarity in Ethiopia 
is not because of primordial tendencies but rather because of the social and 
historical factors of suppression, alienation, differentiation and exclusion. It 
is misleading to describe the rise of ethnic resentments and demands in 
Ethiopia in terms of 'primordialism' as it may discolour the essence of the 
problem. It is not because people wanted to preserve or glorify their 
‘primordial’ identity, but because they wanted to protect their social, 
political and economic rights in the face of alienation, subordination and 
17 
domination by the central rule. In connection to the southward expansion of 
the central rule, as Messay eloquently put it that ‘exportable products such as 
coffee and gold were already being produced [in the south]. Land was 
plentiful and most appropriate for cash crop products of whatever kind. 
There emerged a form of ethnic mentality imbued with a sense of superiority 
that had one single goal: to justify land appropriation and install the rights of 
private property (Messay 1999: 53). Importantly, ‘the ethnic difference made 
land extortion easier both ideologically and politically’ (Ibid.). 
 
Ethnic classification and categorisation in Ethiopia could therefore be 
explained mainly in terms of a social-historical construct, which has been 
born out of a resistance against the injustice of a central rule that identified 
itself (and also identified by others) in terms of a ‘Shewan’ provincialism. 
However, in the process the ’force of blood’ has brought emotionalism and 
rigidity among the ethnic movements and strengthened primordial 
sentiments in order to build politically significant ethnic movements by 
exaggerating sectional claims and distinctiveness. More importantly, the 
1960s and 70s student movement in Ethiopia which had extensive debates 
on various issues and problems of Ethiopia, had been highly influenced by 
the contemporary radical thinking of Marxism and Leninism, and the 
Leninist solution of the nationalities question which theoretically up-holds 
the principle of self-determination including secession for resolving the 
national questions (Teshale 1995: 176, Messay 2002: 12; Marcus 2002: 
221). Although the student movement was very radical in its tone of 
criticising the ruling class for the whole misery and neglect of the 
nationalities in Ethiopia, except the Eritreans movement, it advocated an 
idea that a nationalities question in Ethiopia should be considered 
constructively to allow some sort of regional autonomy or self-government.  
 
Nonetheless, the above discussion reveals that ethnicity is a very elusive and 
fluid phenomenon both at empirical and theoretical levels; under such 
circumstances the task of constructing a political framework like federalism 
using such elusive and fluid conceptualisation would certainly be difficult.  
 
Although, the primordialists’ emphasis on the ‘givens’ and ‘permanency’ of 
ethnic identities is highly exaggerated, the instrumentalists assumption of 
fluidity of ethnic identities is equally overstated. Ethnic identities and ethnic 
solidarities have become reduced and subtle when societies find other 
solidarities on the bases of professionalism, class, political opinion and other 
opportunities. On the other hand, ethnic identities and solidarities become 
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essential and meaningful when people are facing real or imagined threats of 
persecution or discrimination based on their identities; and it is in such 
situations ethnic solidarity are consolidated until the menace has subsided. 
Some identities have remained solid and active for many generations due to 
unforgettable past experiences and on-going threats and opportunities, while 
others have diluted early and easily. As a result, the existing societal 
relations in the political, social and economic arenas and other factor like 
historical memories are very important in shaping the pattern and magnitude 
of ethnic relations and ethnic solidarity.  
 
Despite its nebulousness, ethnicity is becoming a reality in mobilizing large 
numbers of communities under its ethos and desires. Various political 
thinking and arrangements that have been proposed and tried in order to 
obliterate diversity have not been successful so far, rather some of the 
extreme measures such as forced centralisation, assimilation, expulsion or 
ethnic cleansing have brought about unending and colossal violence and 
humanitarian crises. It has remained very difficult either to recognise or 
refuse ethnic entitlement in state restructuring. Recognizing the legitimacy 
of ethnic demands for autonomy could institute discrimination and 
strengthen the distinctiveness and cohesiveness of ethnic identity, which is a 
fluid and elusive phenomenon and encourages the proliferation of further 
ethnic claims. On the other hand, denying the rights could also strengthen 
the distinctiveness and cohesiveness of ethnic identities by providing a 
breeding ground for elevating resentments against the centre; such a denial 
could be used to consolidate and crystallize a group’s identity in order to 
mobilize resistance against the centre.  
 
Many scholars in the field argue that one of the characteristics of federalism 
is its aspiration and purpose to generate and maintain both unity and 
diversity simultaneously (Elazar 1987: 67; Watts 1999: 06; Agranoff 1998: 
11). But recognition of diversity in federal system must be anchored in a 
national ideal that transcends any fixed divisions of power. A hybrid federal 
model that guarantees group autonomy with high incentives for integration 
and inter-ethnic cooperation could be a forward-looking approach. As 
Agranoff put it ‘there must be a fabric of wholeness that moves the federal 
idea forward’ (Agranoff 1998: 14). However, the wholeness and the national 
idea should not be promoted through coercion, but through recurrent 
bargaining progression and flexible arrangements based on the principles of 
self-rule and shared-rule.  
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Political arrangements in multiethnic societies should take into consideration 
the configuration of ethnic cleavages and rivalries in practical conditions. As 
the effectiveness of federalism ‘in accommodating shared-rule with self-rule 
for constituent ethnic groups depends upon the degree to which the groups 
are geographically concentrated and so can be territorially demarcated 
(Watts 2000b: 40). But there is a general agreement- both scholarly and 
empirically- that there must be a less violent and non-offensive political 
designs that could accommodate rather than exacerbate cleavages. Besides, 
encouraging ethnic entitlement simply because of glorification of primordial 
attachments could be a recipe for institutionalising ethnic hostilities and 
ethnic competition that could represent serious risks for public cohesion and 
governability in multiethnic societies. 
 
 In this connection, the on-going ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia is 
not a genuine reflection of either the interests of the ethnic liberation 
movements or the ethnic communities. It is simply driven by a sectional 
interest of the TPLF that used a divide and rule strategy in order to 
countervail its minority position in the ethnic map of Ethiopia.  
 
The federal process in Ethiopia was derailed from the start.  The July 1991 
conference that wedded ethnic discourses in official Ethiopian political 
terrain was filled by intriguing and tricking modalities in enrolling the 
participants, setting the agendas and reaching agreements or consensuses. 
The charter, which was the major offspring of the conference and the first 
official document that endorsed ethnic rights in Ethiopia, was filled with 
some controversial provisions such as the right to secede. The charter was 
the basic document that imbued the succeeding Ethiopian constitution 
(1995) as its tone and vocals were visibly stamped in the core principles of 
the constitution. Though, the EPRDF has considered the transitional period 
charter as a legitimate contract to restructure the Ethiopian polity into an 
ethnic federal system, the charter was produced by an assembly which had 
neither the direct representation of the Ethiopian peoples nor the approval of 
the various ethnic groupings. It was just a collection of self-appointed ethnic 
elites who assumed that they could determine and represent the interests of 
their respective ethnic communities 
 
It can be certainly established that the ethnic federal structure in Ethiopia 
was negotiated in a manner that neither the Ethiopian people nor the ethnic 
groupings have been provided an opportunity for consultation; it was 
engineered by the TPLF and agreed by the ethnic elites. The assumption was 
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that ‘the leaders of the different nations bear the moral and political burden 
of guiding and counselling the people in their national and political 
constituencies (Kinfe 1994: 62). In this view, the major responsibility in 
transforming politics and society in Ethiopia was laid upon the ethnic elites 
rather than the ethnic communities or the people. Because it was believed 
that the ethnic elites’ kinship tie with their community would give them a 
better chance for leadership and privileged position. Basically, it was an 
imposed structure that was founded on a very wobbly and fictitious 
foundation as it reflects only the desire of the ruling government, which 
came to power through armed struggle. The ethnic elites may have naively 
and egoistically legitimised the TPLF’s blue print. However, once its power 
was anchored, the TPLF started the process of capturing and manipulating 
the ethnic communities through manufacturing surrogate ethnic 
organisations and of course by sidelining the ethnic elites that established the 
transitional government. It put down the foundation and conditions for its 
hegemonic desire and goal, but at the expense of derailing genuine political 
negotiation and reconciliation in Ethiopia. All major opposition groups 
boycotted the subsequent key political activities such as the 1992 local 
election, the 1994 election for constitutional assembly and the 1995 and 
2000 general elections.     
 
The TPLF has attempted to remain in power through a superficial and 
deceitful coalition device, the EPRDF. The TPLF-led EPRDF is striving to 
sustain a political travesty that would assure the TPLF’s hegemonic project 
by using ethnic rights discourse. Ethnic rights and ethnic entitlement have 
become an attractive inducement for many of elites from various ethnic 
groups to fell so easily in the trap of the TPLF’s manipulation and 
machination. These self-appointed elites, which did not have any legitimacy 
from their respective ethnic communities, have become an instrument of the 
TPLF’s hegemonic desire, as they were easily susceptible to TPLF’s 
rewarding or/and coercing power.  
 
To get out of the quagmire, the federal model in Ethiopia needs to consider 
multiple criteria such as geography, socio-economic factors, settlement 
patterns, linguistic considerations, population mix and other essential 
factors. For instance, most of the urban areas are inhabited by synchronized 
multiethnic communities where ethnic identities are so diluted and less 
significant and ethno linguistic criterion have become inappropriate and 
inapplicable. Whereas, the rural areas, where the overwhelming Ethiopians 
live, are inhabited in most cases by a concentration of a specific ethno-
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linguistic community in a specific territory, it may raise a need for some 
kind of structure that could recognize such settlement pattern and linguistic 
considerations, but with utmost respect for the rights of minority residents. 
More importantly, the federal project in Ethiopia should reward ethnic 
fluidity and intermix by politically discouraging exclusive arrangements and 
fragmentations that could hinder mobility and evolutionary fusion.       
 
Furthermore, it is important to create a hybrid federal model that can respect 
ethnic groups, encourage inter-ethnic cooperation, evolutionary fusion and 
harmonisation by suppressing hubris and upholding humility; by engineering 
a political interaction that promotes respect and trust while undermining and 
dissuading vengeances and arrogant behaviours and activities. A political 
system that recognises and respects diverse identities, upholds achievements 
and merits in place of ascriptive requirements and nepotism can lead to the 
creation of a desirable system based on trust and tolerance among ethno-
linguistic groups.  After all, ethnic identity or nationality are not an all-
embracing or the greatest identity of an individual, community or people. 
People used to change them frequently when opportunities or threats are 
greater. There are various and plural identities in which people would find 
very important, of course, ethnic identity could be one of them. As Amartya 
Sen (2006) powerfully put it that: “The illusion of unique identity is much 
more divisive than the universe of plural and diverse classification that 
characterize the world in which we actually live.”  
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